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By Hans Dieter Seibel 
 
 
Underdeveloping Nigeria through reregulation -will community banks survive? 
 
 
Regulating the financial system through restrictions on foreign exchange, interest rate 
controls and constraints imposed on financial institutions have been among the principal 
instruments of financial repression in low-income countries. In recent years, many have 
taken to deregulation, but mostly in response to donor persuasion and pressure rather than 
conviction. Unpopular political regimes have found it difficult to get over their initial hardship 
period which the restructuring of a whole economy and its financial system entails. The 
Nigerian Government, in a populist gesture, has just succumbed to the temptations of re-
regulation. Commercial banks are hard hit. Small farmers and microentrepreneurs are 
among the first victims 
 
Community banks are an institutional innovation of the deregulation period. Within a three-
year period, around 900 of them have come into existence. These are local financial 
institutions the share capital of which is owned approximately half by self-help groups and 
half by individuals of the respective communities. Bank ownership by self-help groups is the 
ultimate form of linkage banking. These community banks provide convenient deposit facil-
ities and access to credit to the self-help groups who are their co-owners. They were also 
found to be highly innovative and responsive to local needs and demands. They form part of 
a network, which is under their own secondary-tier regulatory authority. Will they escape 






Until 1986, the financial system of Nigeria was tightly regulated, with exchange and interest 
rates fixed by the Government. Through quotas, tariffs, licences and subsidies, the 
government intervened in virtually all spheres of the economy. Entrepreneurial activity which 
exists in abundance in Nigeria, flowed more into the struggle for import licences, contracts 
and subsidies than productive activities. Cheap imports substantially reduced the profitability 
and thus the scale of national food production. The economy, and government revenue, of 
OPEC country Nigeria largely depended on petroleum exports, with minimal diversification. 
In the context of political instability, massive market distortions and gross factor 






In 1986, the government deregulated tile financial system and introduced, in collaboration 
with IMF and World Bank, a structural adjustment program (SAP). Deregulation altered the 
financial System: 
interest rates rose, and so did monetary and credit aggregates which expanded at 
unprecedented rates (CBN 1993:1).  In particular, domestic resource (including savings) 
mobilization grew rapidly; the financial infrastructure changed and expanded substantially 
(including the number of banks and bank branches, vast numbers of Bureaux de Change 
and about 900 community banks) exceeding by far the supervisory capacity of the Central 
Bank; and financial innovations in the banking sector became prominent (Oyewole 1993). As 
imports were cut, food prices rose, and so did national food production, accompanied by a 
large scale back-to the land movement. The percentage of food imports to total imports 
  1declined from a peak of 6.2 % in l980 to under 1 % in l988 and then rose to 2.3 % in 1989. 
Agriculture and the agro-industrial sector enhanced their competitiveness substantially. ,,Ni-
geria previously a huge importer of rice and maize is now almost sell-sufficient in these 
grains. The share of the agricultural sector in GDP has stabilised at over 30 % in both 1986 
and 1990, a big improvement on the 20 % level of 1980.” (ECPER 1993:10). During 1986-
90, the average annual growth rate of GDP was 3.66 %, while during the pre-SAR period of 
1979-85 it was a mere 0,4% p.a. (ECPER 1993:10). In a speech in November 1993, the 
Governor of the Central Bank stated that, 
 
,,the positive impact of financial liberalization on financial savings, competition 
and quality of financial services is manifest.” (Ogwuma 1993:3) 
 
Yet, the government failed to keep its budget under control, with internal public debt 
outstanding continuing its upward trend throughout and external debt outstanding climbing 
from $13 billion in 1985 to over $33 billion by l990 (or from l5% to 110%, respectively, of 
GNP) (ECPER 1993:11). Various forms of subsidies, misallocations and misappropriations 
continued unabated; and structural reforms were only hall-heartedly carried out. During the 
pre-SAP period 1980-86, Federal Government deficits averaged N 3.9 billion a year, 
increasing to an annual average of N 23.4 billion during the SAP years 1987-90, with a 
pronounced upward trend (ECPER 1993:9; cf. Ndekwu 1990,1991; Philips 1990). 
 
As a result, alter a - perhaps doubtful – all-time low of 5.5% in both 1985 and 1986, inflation 
skyrocketed, and the combination of political and economic instability proved lethal to 
deregulation. In 1993, the results of democratic elections were cancelled and a military 






In January 1994, the government cancelled deregulation, adding policy instability to political 
and economic instability. Exchange controls were tightened by fixing the exchange rate 
(causing an immediate drop of the market value of the Naira by 50%) and reverting the sale 
of foreign exchange to the monopoly of the Central Bank. All interest rates ware fixed, with 
savings and deposit rates pegged at 12-15 %, while the lending rate ceiling was set at 21 % 
(at a time of 100% inflation p.a.!), rendering real returns on savings extremely negative and 
leaving a margin to the banks mostly inadequate to cover costs of funds, administrative 
costs and risks. Re-regulation was also extended to other sectors (including the fixing of 
hotel rates for non residents at arbitrary and oftentimes astronomical heights). 
 
Nigeria's re-regulation policy reads as if inspired by the author's paper on, How to 
Undermine Financial Systems and Development, though in 1/1994 this was only in press 
and not yet available to policymakers in Nigeria (Seibel 1994). 
 
A consensus is building up among academics in Nigeria that while deregulation was a good 
thing it failed in its implementation: ,,The bold corrective measures embodied in SAP were 
appropriate and represented the best way out of the quagmire. Faulty implementation has, 
however, robbed the country of much of the fruits...' (ECPER 1993:18). Or in the words of 
the new Head of State, General Sani Abacha: ,,Deregulation requires discipline among the 
key operators in the vital sectors, which absence has resulted in the near collapse of the 
economy today", at the same time adding that, ,,no country anywhere in the world freely 
surrenders its economy to the absolute interplay of market forces” (15/2/1994; cf. Daily 
Times 16/2/94:1). As “deregulation was dogged by innumerable distortions, resulting in low 
economic input, rising interest rates, currency depreciation, and unemployment” (General 
Abache, cf. The Guardian 16/2/94:1), re-regulation is being considered as an effort to 
restore that discipline. This decision however appears without scholarly foundation; to the 
  2contrary, ,,... a reversion to the era of administrative controls in the economy will not solve 
underlying problems and will not put us in a durable path of self-sustaining growth... 
implementation should now be much more consistent... there seems to exist no other viable 
alternative." (ECPER 1993:18, 23), adding strong warnings against exchange and interest 
rate controls and equally strong recommendations in favour of budgetary restraint and 






The results of re-regulation evident in February 1994 ware disastrous. The loss of 
confidence in politics is now followed by a loss of confidence in the economy and the 
policymakers behind it. The Central Bank, hitherto an adamant advocate of deregulation, 
now appears as an instrument of the government. 
 
Hundreds of Bureaux de Change ware wiped out overnight, banks lost their hitherto highly 
profitable foreign exchange business, and resource mobilization dropped. The number of 
banks in distress -many of them weakened by hazardous experimentation unsupervised by 
the Central Bank during deregulation goes up almost by the day, causing bank runs and 
further aggravating the Situation of the already shaky banking industry. According to press 
reports, financial institutions are now turning to non legal forms of transactions to survive 
(e.g., lending charges hidden in the principal, bringing effective rates up to pre-reregulation 
levels around 38% -still far below the rising inflation rates).Only the community banks, which 
were excluded from foreign exchange transactions, with their strong resource base, their 
prudential lending and their own internal bank supervision System, seem to be winners, 
attracting local customers who lost confidence in their commercial bank. So far they have 
adhered to the Bankers Tariff, thought hey do not fall under the banking law; hence they 
may also have to struggle to survive on the margins between the fixed interest rates on 
savings and credit. No community bank failures have so far been reported, and no licences 
have been revoked. 
 
An ECPER journal article concludes that Nigeria, similar to other resource-rich countries like 
Zaire or Zambia, has ,,wasted the opportunities created in the form of inherited natural 
wealth... Successful countries and firms are those that create, rather than inherit, 
competitive advantage; those that exploit opportunity, that relish challenge and thrive in the 
face of adversity." (Hawkins 1993:32). To this one should add that the latter would be an 
adequate description of Nigerian microentrepreneurs in the thriving informal sector (including 
the informal financial sector), while the former is the legacy of a state-interventionist stance. 
 
The implications of the new monetary policy may be summarized in one sentence: 






ocal Financial Institutions Owned by Self-help Groups and Individuals 
Community banks are an institutional innovation which evolved during the deregulation 
period, representing the highest stage in linkage banking: self-help groups linked to banks 
through ownership - a case of informal financial institutions turned into formal intermediaries 
(cf. SeibeI 1985,1989,1992). 
 
The latter is of great relevancy in a country that as a whole has perhaps the strongest 
System of informal financial institutions in Africa, among which the indigenous rotating and 
non-rotating savings and credit associations are most prominent, such as esusu and ajo 
among the Yoruba, dashi among the Hausa, isusu among the lgbo, Oja and aterugba 
  3among the lgala, bam among the Tiv, etc., and a vast array of derivatives (Seibel & Damachi 
1982; Seibel 1984; Seibel 1989; Seibel & Marx 1987). 
Community banks are local financial institutions registered under Decree No. 46 (28/4/1990) 
and owned directly by the people and their self-help groups. They abide by the Bankers 
Tariff and other Central Bank regulations. Their interest rates are similar to those of 
commercial banks (CBN 1993:46). After a provisional period they might eventually come 
under Central Bank supervision. 
 
Equity capital requirements are N 250,000 [US $ 11,364 at the official rate or US $ 5,208 at 
current market rates] (compared to N 50 million for commercial banks). They fully depend on 
locally mobilized resources, comprising mainly equity capital, deposits and accumulated 
profits. Ownership is dispersed over a wide range, comprising three categories of owners 
with roughly the following shares: 
 
The Community Development 
Association, which is a communitybased self-help group:      30 % 
 
Member-based self-help groups (unions of craftsmen, traders 
associations, farmers groups, 
  cooperatives,  etc.):        22  % 
  
  Individuals:        50  % 
 
Their main purpose is the provision of convenient and safe savings deposit facilities and the 
granting of credit to the local population, including loans to the Community Development 
Associations, the various self-help groups in a community and individuals. 
 
The decree vests overall responsibility for the policy and operational performance of 
community banks in the NBCB (National Board of Community Banks), headed by a 
Governing Board, with its seat in Abuja, the new capital city. NBCB is a second-tier 
regulatory authority which has supervisory powers over the community banks (comparable 
to the Central Bank, which is a first-tier regulatory authority supervising commercial and 
merchant banks). NBCB reports to the Central Bank on a quarterly basis. At the same time; 
NBCB is an interest association, comparable to DGRV and DSGV in Germany, and offers 
central banking functions to its members. 
 
During the period of inception, its administrative costs are borne by the government. As 
subsidies (for institution-building, not credit!) are withdrawn, NBCB expects to eventually 
become self-reliant on the basis of mandatory contributions from community banks and fees 
for services. 
 
During the first three years,  the operations of the board were organized in four zones, 
covering the whole country, with their seats in Bauchi for the NE, Kaduna for the NW, Enugu 
for the SE and Lagos for the SW. Each zonal office has a staff of about 300, providing 
promotion & appraisal, training, and supervisory services through Appraisal, lnspection and 
Training Sections under the NBCB Operations Department. With the steady increase in 
banks, the number of zonal offices is presently being doubled. The additional zonal offices 
are located in Makurdi, Minna, Benin City and Uyo. 
 
For a period of two years the banks are under the guidance of their zonal offices and the 
National Board, NBCB. A provisional license is granted by the NBCB. After 15 months of 
satisfactory operation, an operating license is to be granted by the Central Bank. 
 
  4Having mobilized up to N 10 million and more per bank (one has mobilized N 23 million), the 
community banks have proven beyond doubt that local savings exist. 
 
The first community bank opened up in 12/1991. Within the first three years of existence, 
their number grew to 879, and the total amount of savings has passed the N 2 billion mark. 
By 12/1993 a total of N 941 million had been disbursed in loans. 
 
The Central Bank routinely reports on  community banks. In its Annual Report for 1992 
(OBN,1993:46) states that, 
 
,,Agriculture and petty trading were relatively large recipients of the banks' loan 
facilities while significant amounts also went to petty restaurant businesses and 
cottage industries. A substantial amount was also lent to small-scale enterprises 





CB Community Bank, Ltd.; A Case Study (2/1994) 
BGB (a fictious name for a real community bank) was established in 9/1991 upon the 
initiative of local leaders organized in a Community Development Association (CDA). It has 
269 shareholders who established the bank without any equity or other lending support from 
outside, including NBGB, with the following proportions of share capital: 
 
  Community  Development  Association        30  % 
  Societies  and  corporate  bodies        22  % 
  Individuals        48  % 
 
The bank does not serve as a conduit for government loans. 
 
Total assets are N 13.2 million, including N 1.7 million in fixed assets. The deposit base 
grew as follows (in Naira): 
 
  12/1991        1.76  million 
  12/1992        6.62  million 
  12/1993        10.58  million 
 
The bank provides deposit, •credit (including overdraft) and checking services, the latter 
through a corresponding bank. 
 
Deposits as of 12/1993 were comprised of the following: 
 
  Time  deposits        3.12  million 
  Demand  deposits        1.23  million 
  General  saving  accounts        6.03  million 
  Daily deposit collection 
  and  mobile  banking        0.20  million 
 
The loan portfolio (loans and advances) amounts to N 2.39 million (12/1993). Among others 
the portfolio includes a three-year loan to the GDA for the purchase of three income-
generating 30-seater buses and a lending scheme to groups of market vendors in 
cooperation with their respective market associations: up to N 180,000 p.a. to the livestock 
section, N 300,000 to the wood section, N 250,000 to the foodstuff section, and N 300,000 to 
the remaining sections. 
 
  514.15 % of the loan portfolio are overdue (but not necessarily bad debts). Portfolio quality is 
shown by the structure of bad debt provisions in 1993, which follows the Prudential 
Guidelines (effective as of 1993) as issued by the Central Bank: 
 
Payments  overdue  3  months       N  102,242 
  Payments overdue 6 months            N   23,510 
  Payments  overdue  12  months       N  151,731. 
 
 
The bank is required to hold a cash balance of N 3 million at any time. Excess liquidity is 
placed in a call account with the corresponding commercial bank (at 19% interest). 
 
Interest rates are 12 % on passbook savings, 12.5 % on 7-day call deposits, 13 % on 3-
months time deposits, 14 % on 6-months time deposits and 15 % on 12-months time 
deposits. Depending on maturity (maximum mostly 1 year) and risk, the interest rate on 
loans varies from 19 % to 21 %. There is no interest rate differentiation between individuals 
and groups. 
 
Among the most interesting financial innovations of BCB is a daily deposit collection scheme 
operated through a staff of 10 organized in 5 teams of two each on the nearby market. 
These doorstep services are modelled after the alajo scheme (Yoruba word for daily deposit 
collector) which originated among the Yoruba in Southwestern Nigeria and spread from 
there among the coast to neighbouring countries (Ghana: anago susu; Ivory Coast: nago 
- cf. Seibel & Marx 1937). Each bank team reaches about 100 customers per day and 
collects between N 20-35,000. lnstalments due at the end of the month may be deducted 
from a client's savings account If so arranged. 
 
In 1992 the bank made a loss (after provision for bad debts); in 1993 it broke even, with a 




 Case for Development Assistance? 
German technical assistance might greatly contribute to the further evolution of community 
banks in Nigeria, particularly if provided by the Savings Banks Foundation for International 
Cooperation or by Deutscher Raiffeisen- und Genossenschaftsverband (German 
Confederation of Cooperatives) representing together perhaps the world's broadest network 
of local financial institutions (mobilizing 77.2% of all savings and delivering 50.9 % of all 
credit in Germany in 1993). But this might pose a dilemma to German development 
assistance: 
On the one hand, the German Government requires as a conditionality that partner 
governments provide the right policy environment. On the other hand, it wants to promote 
viable institutions serving the poor in sustainable ways. As usual in the developing world, 
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Exchange rates on 18/2/1994: 
Office rate:   US-$1.- = Naira 22                                              Market rate:   US-$1.- = Naira 48 
  7